Abstract. Consider the standard hospitals/residents problem, or the two-sided many-to-one stable matching problem, and assume that the true preference lists of both sides are complete (containing all members of the opposite side) and strict (having no ties). The lists actually submitted, however, are truncated. Let I be such a truncated instance. When we apply the resident-proposing differed acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley to I, the algorithm produces a set of tentative matches (resident-hospital pairs). We say that a tentative match in this set is finalizable in I if it is in the resident-optimal stable matching for every completion of I (a complete instance of which I is a truncation). We study the problem we call FTM (Finalizability of Tentative Matches) of deciding if a given tentative match is finalizable in a given truncated instance. We first show that FTM is coNP-complete, even in the stable marriage case where the quota of each hospital is restricted to be 1. We then introduce and study a special case: we say that a truncated instance is resident-minimal, if further truncation of the preference lists of the residents inevitably changes the set of tentative matches. Residentminimal instances are not only practically motivated but also useful in natural backtrack computations for the general case. We give a computationally useful characterization of negative instances of FTM in this special case, which, for instance, can be used to formulate an integer program for FTM. For the stable marriage case, in particular, this characterization yields a polynomial time algorithm to solve FTM for resident-minimal instances. On the other hand, we show that FTM remains coNP-complete for resident-minimal instances, if the maximum quota of the hospitals is 2 or larger. We also give a polynomial-time decidable sufficient condition for a tentative match to be finalizable in the general case.
Introduction
In many matching markets in practice which are modeled by the two-sided stable matching problem of Gale and Shapley [1] @(often called the hospitals/residents problem), the task of the participants to form a preference list is far from trivial. The large number of participants in the opposite side makes it practically impossible to evaluate all of them in enough details to precisely determine the preference order. In some cases, quite costly procedures such as interviews are involved in the evaluation process, which makes it even harder to form a precise preference list. If each participant is required to submit a complete preference list in such a market, then the submitted list would be inevitably inaccurate. Otherwise, the lists submitted would be short.
In the latter case, non-negligible number of participants remain unmatched after the matching procedure. This is the case, for example, in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) of the United States [4] , which assigns candidates for residency to positions in hospitals. To provide further opportunities for the candidates and positions that have failed to be matched in the main matching round called MRM (Main Residency Match), NRMP organizes a post-match program called SOAP (Supplemental Offer and Acceptance Program). Unfortunately, the design of this post-match program lacks a theoretical basis. One clear drawback is that the final matching which results from the entire process, MRM followed by SOAP, is not stable, despite the popularity of NRMP as a working example of the stable matching model.
The algorithmic question studied in this paper is motivated by an approach to address the above issues: a multi-round stable matching procedure. This procedure is designed to produce a stable matching as the final outcome, while allowing participants to incrementally form their preference lists. In the first round, each participant submits a truncation of its true preference list, listing only a small number of candidates it ranks the highest. The standard deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm of Gale and Shapley [1] is applied to these truncated preference lists and stops prematurely with a partial outcome. In the second and successive rounds, the lists of the participants are extended, with more candidates added in their tails as needed to continue the execution of the DA algorithm.
We list potential benefits of such a multi-round procedure.
1. In the first round, the participant can concentrate on the evaluations of those candidates that are potentially ranked the highest, which makes it easier to form an accurate list for the first submission. 2. In subsequent rounds, some participants do not need to submit extensions to their lists, as those extensions are not required by the DA algorithm. The saving in the evaluation effort for those participants can be huge. 3. Even for a participant who does need to submit an extension, the evaluation task can be easier since (1) some of the remaining candidates may be excluded from considerations as it can be deduced (by the central agency) from the submissions so far that they have no possibility to be matched to the participant and (2), except for in the last round, the participant may concentrate on those candidate it considers the strongest among the remaining candidates, similarly to the situation in the first round.
We model the situation after each round in such a multi-round procedure as follows. We assume that the true preference lists of the participants are complete, listing all members on the opposite side, and strict, allowing no ties. If J is an instance with complete preference lists and I is obtained from J by truncating some preference lists of J, then we call I a truncation of J and J a completion of I.
When we run the resident-proposing DA algorithm on an instance I executing as many steps as possible in the absence of the missing parts of the preference lists, the execution results in the set of tentative matches for I, which we denote by tent(I) (see Section 2 for a formal definition of the DA algorithm and tentative matches for truncated instances). If I happens to be complete, then tent(I) is nothing but the resident-optimal stable matching for I [1] . When I is truncated, each match in tent(I) is truly tentative and may eventually be rejected when the DA algorithm continues execution on some completion of I. We are interested in the following property of tentative matches and the question on this property. Definition 1. We say that a match in tent(I) is finalizable in I if this match is in tent(J), the resident-optimal stable matching for J, for every completion J of I.
FTM (Finalizability of Tentative Matches)
Instance An instance I of the hospitals/residents problem and a match (r, h) ∈ tent(I). Question Is (r, h) finalizable in I?
For positive integer k, we write k-FTM for the version of FTM where the instances are restricted to those having quota at most k for every hospital: in particular, 1-FTM deals with the one-to-one (stable marriage) instances.
In each round of our multi-round procedure, we first compute tent(I) by the DA algorithm, where I is the instance specified by the submissions up to that round, and then compute the set of finalizable matches in tent(I). Those finalizable matches are officially finalized and, in the succesive rounds, residents in the finalized matches stop participation and the quotas of the hospitals therein are reduced. In the final round, each remaining participant is asked to submit the complete preference list on the remaining participants in the opposite side. It is clear from the definition of finalizability that the matching formed by the entire process is identical to the one that would be obtained in one round where the participants submit the complete true preference lists. It is important to note here that we do not need to compute the set of finalizable matches exactly: any subset is sufficient to ensure the correct outcome and a large subset is desirable for having good progresses through rounds. Thus, even though we have negative results on the tractability of FTM as described below, they by no means deny the utility of the notion of finalizability.
Our first result is indeed negative (Theorem 1): FTM, even 1-FTM in fact, is coNP-complete.
We then look at a special case. When the resident-proposing DA algorithm is executed on an instance and resident r is tentatively matched to hospital h in the outcome, the tail part of the preference list of r after h remains "unconsumed" by the algorithm. We say that an instance I is resident-minimal if this unconsumed tail is empty for every resident r. Equivalently, I is resident-minimal if the set of matches (r, h) such that h is on the preference list of r equals the set of matches that are proposed in the execution of the DA algorithm on I. Resident-minimal instances are of interest for the following reasons.
1. A natural and purely algorithm-driven matching procedure with incremental submissions would ask for further submissions of participants only when extending their preference lists is absolutely necessary for a progress. In a procedure that applies this policy on residents, the instance we have at each execution step is resident-minimal. 2. Suppose we use a backtrack algorithm to decide if a match is finalizable in a general truncated instance I, which executes the DA algorithm and branches on the next preferred hospital of a resident when it is not given in I. The extension of I that the algorithm constructs in each branching path eventually becomes resident-minimal and the backtrack search beyond this search node can be pruned if an efficient algorithm for resident-minimal instances is available.
Although it is possible to define an analogous notion of hospital-minimal instances, it is not as natural or as useful as that of resident-minimal instances mainly because the preference lists of hospitals are not "sequentially consumed" in the resident-proposing algorithm. We write FTM-RM for FTM (and k-FTM-RM for k-FTM) in which the instances are restricted to be resident-minimal. Our main result on FTM-RM is a computationally useful characterization of negative instances of FTM-RM (Theorem 2). This characterization may be used, for example, to formulate an integer program or to design a dynamic programming algorithm for FTM-RM. We also give a polynomial time algorithm for 1-FTM-RM, the stable marriage case, based on this characterization (Theorem 4). On the other hand, we show that 2-FTM-RM, and hence FTM-RM, remains coNP-complete (Theorem 5).
We also develop a polynomial-time decidable sufficient condition for a tentative match being finalizable (Theorem 6). This sufficient condition may be used to compute a subset of finalizable matches in the proposed multi-round stable matching procedures. We also show that this condition is necessary for 1-FTM-RM (Theorem 7). This gives another proof that 1-FTM-RM is polynomial time solvable.
Applications The notion of finalizability plays an essential role in a small scale market: that of student/superviosr matching in the department the author belongs to. This matching is to assign each of slightly over 100 undergraduate students to a graduation project supervised by one of the 14 faculty members. Every student must be matched to a supervisor, since the project is mandatory, and the quotas of the supervisors are as even as possible subject to the total being exactly equal to the number of students.
In 2014, the department decided to adopt a 2-rounds stable matching algorithm, replacing the old system that does not produce stable matchings. In the new procedure, each supervisor submits a complete preference list of students prior to the first round, based on grade points and interviews. Then in the first round, each student submits a truncated preference list of length at most three. The DA algorithm is executed and, among the resulting tentative matches, those matches that are found to be finalizable by the sufficient condition in Section 5 are officially finalized. Students without a finalized match proceed to the second round, where they are required to submit a complete preference list of unfilled supervisors that is consistent with the list in the first round. The final matching is guaranteed to be stable and, somewhat surprisingly, a majority of the students get their matches finalized in the first round. The task of those students who proceed to the second round is also easier, sine the a majority of superviors are filled in the first round and do not participate in the second round. Though the use of the sufficient condition seems quite effective in this particular application, having an exact algorithm for finalizability would potentially lead to a further saving in the ranking efforts the students, as more tentative matches in the first round could be finalized.
Although multi-round procedures based on the finalizability of tentative matches are theoretically attractive alternatives to the current NRMP procedure, it requires a preliminary investigation to decide whether they are as effective as in the above small scale example. The first step would be to compute the finalizablity of the matches produced by the main matching procedure of NRMP in the past, interpreting the preference lists used in the procedure as truncations of the true lists. This task is challenging, because of the intractability of FTM and the size of the market. We note, however, that we may not necessarily need exact solutions. Reasonably good estimates on the number of finalizable matches may be sufficient for our evaluation purposes. Theorem 2 (a characterization of negative instances in the resident-minimal case) and Proposition 8 together with Theorem 6 (a polynomial time computable sufficient condition for finalizability) would be indispensable in computing upper and lower bounds on that number.
Related work Truncation of preference lists in the two-sided matching model have been studied in a different context, namely strategic manipulations. For example, Roth and Rothblum [7] study the one-to-one matching case and show that there are instances where a participant on the proposed side (a hospital in our model) may expect to benefit significantly by truncating its true preference list, even in the situation where little information on the preference lists of other participants is available.
More traditionally, incomplete preference lists arise not as truncations but as true representations of preferences, where candidates not on the list are simply meant unacceptable. There has been active research on the complexity of computing stable matchings for instances allowing incomplete preference lists and/or ties (see [3] for a survey).
Rastegari et al. [6] and Rastegari et al. [5] address the incompleteness of the preference orders that are inevitable in large markets in practice. They analyze matching markets where the participants submit their preferences in the form of partial orders that are consistent with their true total orders. The authors of [6] aim at optimizing the number of interviews needed to sufficiently refine the partial orders while the authors of [5] study the complexity of reasoning about the stable matchings for the true hidden preference orders using the partial information available. Our present work may be viewed as dealing with a special case of their model, where the partial preference order can be represented in the form of a truncation.
A result analogous to the coNP-completeness of 1-FTM (Theorem 1) may be found in their work [5] . Restricting themselves to the stable marriage case, they consider the problem, among others, of deciding if a given match is a necessary match, that is, if it is contained in the resident-optimal (employer-optimal, in their setting) stable matching for every completion of the given partial orders into total orders. They show that this problem is coNP-complete. Theorem 1 in our present paper implies that this hardness holds for special instances where the partial orders are restricted to those representable by truncations. Their result does not imply our result and, moreover, neither does their proof, since their reduction uses partial orders that are not representable by truncations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives preliminaries of this paper. In Section 3 we prove the coNP-completeness of 1-FTM. In Section 4 we study resident-minimal instances. In Section 5, we give the sufficient condition for finalizability.
Preliminaries
Formally, an instance I of our hospitals/residents problem is a 5-tuple (R, H, {q h } h∈H , {λ r } r∈R , {π h } h∈H ), where R is the set of residents, H is the set of hospitals, q h for each h is the quota of h, λ r for each r ∈ R is the preference list of r on H, and π h for each h ∈ H is the preference list of h on R. The first three components R, H, and {q h } h∈H will always be denoted by these symbols and when we speak of various instances in a context, these components will be common among those instances: only the preference lists will vary. A preference list on a set S is complete if it lists all members of S. Our instances in general may have preference lists that are not complete. An instance is residentcomplete (hospital-complete, resp.) if the preference list of each resident (hospital, resp.) is complete. It is complete if it is both resident-and hospital-complete. A match is a pair in R × H: we say match (r, h) involves r and h. For each set of matches M and h ∈ H, we define res M = {r | (r, h) ∈ M for some h ∈ H} and res h M = {r | (r, h) ∈ M }. A set M of matches is a matching in I if M contains at most one match that involves r, for each r ∈ R, and |res h M | ≤ q h for each h ∈ H.
We use + operator for concatenation of sequences and for appending or prepending elements to sequences. A sequence α is a prefix of a sequence β, and β is an extension of β, if β can be written as α + γ for some possibly empty sequence γ. The length of sequence α is denoted by |α|. Our sequences will never have duplicate elements and therefore the length of α is precisely the cardinality of the set of elements in α.
We say that an instance I is an extension of an instance J, and that J is a truncation of I, if the preference list of each resident and each hospital in I is the extension of that in J. An extension I of J is resident-changeless (hospital-changeless, resp.) if the preference list of each resident (hospital, resp.) is identical in I and J.
We apply the DA algorithm to a truncated instance I and stop when further execution is not possible due to the truncations. We represent the intermediate result of this execution by two sets of matches: tentative matches are those that have been proposed but not rejected in the algorithm execution; pending matches are tentative matches that have not been rejected because of the incompleteness of the preference list of the hospital involved. See below for a more precise definition.
We formalize the execution of our version of the DA algorithm as event sequences. Let I be an instance. An event for I is either (r, h) + , the proposal of a match (r, h), or (r, h) − , the rejection of a match (r, h). Let σ be a sequence of events for I (or an event sequence for I, for short). We say that (r, h) is proposed (rejected, resp.) in σ if (r, h) + ((r, h) − , resp.) appears in σ. We denote by prop(σ) (rej(σ), resp.) the set of matches that are proposed (rejected, resp.) in σ. We define tent(σ) = prop(σ)\rej(σ) and call a match in tent(σ) tentative in σ. In words, a match is tentative in σ if it is proposed but not rejected in σ. If a tentative match (r, h) in σ is such that r is not in the preference list of h in the instance I then it is a pending match in σ with respect to I. We denote by pend I (σ) the set of pending matches in σ with respect to I. Remark 1. In the standard DA algorithm which regards a missing resident r in the preference list of hospital h as unacceptable to h, there is no notion of pending matches: the proposal of r to h can be immediately rejected. In our version, such a proposal should be pending, unless h has filled its quota with proposals from residents in its list, as we intend to continue the algorithm when more residents are added to the preference list of h. Also note that the set tent(σ) depends only on the event sequence σ and not on the instance while the set pend I (σ) depends on the instance.
Let I be an instance and M an arbitrary set of matches. We say that (r, h) ∈ M is ousted from M in I, if the preference list of h contains at least q h residents from res h M and either r is missing from this list or preceded by q h or more residents from res h M in this list. In other words, (r, h) is ousted from M in I, if, no matter how the preference list of h in I is completed, r is not among the top q h members of M in the completed list. We let ousted I (M ) denote the set of matches ousted from M in I. We say that an event sequence is I-feasible if it can be shown so by the inductive procedure below.
1. An empty sequence is I-feasible. 2. Suppose an event sequence σ is I-feasible. Then, σ + (r, h) + for each (r, h) ∈ R × H is I-feasible if r ∈ res tent(σ), (r, h) ∈ prop(σ), h appears in the preference list of r ∈ I, and (r, h ) ∈ rej(σ) for every h ∈ H that precedes h in the preference list of r in I. On the other hand, σ + (r, h)
Remark 2. We have ousted(prop(σ))\rej(σ) = ousted(tent(σ)) for I-feasible σ. Therefore, the condition for the I-feasibility of σ + (r, h) − above may be expressed as (r, h) ∈ ousted(tent(σ)), which is more consistent with the traditional definition of the DA algorithm. We use the condition in the present form, since it makes the monotonicity of the feasibility expressed by the following proposition obvious.
For brevity, we refer to I-feasible event sequences simply as I-feasible sequences. Proposition 1. Let I be an instance and let σ + e be an I-feasible sequence where e is a single event. Then, for each I-feasible sequence σ that contains all events in σ but not e, σ + e is I-feasible.
Given instance I, the execution of the DA algorithm on I results in an arbitrary, due to the non-determinacy of the algorithm, but maximal I-feasible sequence. The following observation that is well known for the standard DA algorithm [1] holds also for our variant.
Proposition 2. Let I be an instance and let σ and σ be two maximal I-feasible sequences. Then, σ and σ contain the same set of events.
Proof. Suppose σ contains an event that is not in σ. Among such events, choose one that appears first in σ and call it e. Then σ followed by e is I-feasible, due to Proposition 1, contradicting the maximality of σ. Therefore, σ does not have any event not in σ and vice versa.
For an instance I with a maximal I-feasible sequence σ, we denote prop(σ), rej(σ), tent(σ), and pend I (σ) by prop(I), rej(I), tent(I), and pend(I). This notation is justified since these sets do not depend on the choice of σ and determined solely by I, by Proposition 2. We say that instance I proposes (rejects, resp.) a match if it is in prop(I) (rej(I), resp.).
We say that an event sequence is feasible if it is I-feasible for some instance I.
Hardness of 1-FTM
To prove hardness results we use the following folklore. A similar statement appears in the description of SATISFIABILITY problem in Garey and Johnson [2] . We include a proof for self-containedness.
Proposition 3. SAT is NP-complete, even when restricted to a clause set in which each variable appears exactly twice positively and exactly once negatively.
Proof. Let a clause set S be given. We show below that S can be converted into a clause set S , without changing the satisfiability, in which each variable appears exactly three times and moreover at least once positively and at least once negatively. By replacing some variables by their negations if necessary, S may further be converted into a clause set satisfying the condition of the proposition.
Suppose variable x occurs k times in S. We may assume k ≥ 2 since otherwise the value of x can be fixed without changing the satisfiability. Then, we replace occurrences of x by distinct new variables x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and add clausesx i ∨x i+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where x k+1 = x 1 , to force these variables to take the same value. The clause set S is obtained from S by doing this for all variables. Theorem 1. 1-FTM, and hence FTM, is coNP-complete.
Proof. That FTM is in coNP is trivial. We prove the hardness by reducing SAT to the complement of 1-FTM.
Let S be an arbitrary set of SAT clauses. Let X be the set of variables of S, and C 1 , . . . , C m the enumeration of clauses in S. Relying on Proposition 3, we assume that each variable occurs positively in exactly two clauses and negatively in exactly one clause.
We construct an instance I = (R, H, {q h } h∈H , {π h } h∈H , {λ r } r∈R ) as follows. R consists of two distinguished residents r 0 and r 1 , together with distinct residents r
x , and p 2 x for each x ∈ X. Fix x ∈ X. Let C j0 , C j1 , and C j2 be the three clauses in which x appears and assume that the occurrence of x in C j0 is negative. We say that resident p x for some x) that are associated with the variable occurrences in C j , in an arbitrary order, followed by r 0 .
The preference lists of the residents are as follows. Unlike in the description above for hospitals, these lists are truncated after the specified elements.
1. The list of r 0 is h 1 , h 2 , . . . x in this order, followed by h j , where C j is the clause that contains the variable occurrence with which resident p 0 x is associated. 5. For each x ∈ x and i = 1, 2, the list of p 
We show that (r 1 , h 0 ) is not finalizable in I if and only if S is satisfiable.
Let J be an extension of I. We say that resident p of the form p i x is activated in J, if match (p, h j ) is proposed in J, where h j is such that C j contains the variable occurrence to which p is associated and hence h j is the last entry of the preference list of p in I. Observe that, p (1) and (2) 
is proposed, which happens if and only if there is a chain of rejections/proposals of resident r 0 through the hospitals h 1 , . . . , h m leading to this proposal. Since the pair (r 0 , h j ) is rejected, provided that this pair is proposed, if and only if at least one resident on the list of h j that is associated with a variable occurrence in C j is activated, we conclude that S is satisfiable if and only if there is an extension of I in which (r 1 , h 0 ) is rejected.
Resident-minimal instances
In this section, we study resident-minimal instances.
Simple extensions and prescriptions
In this subsection, we define the notions of simple extensions and prescriptions, which characterize negative instances of FTM-RM. Hospital-complete instances play an important role here.
Proposition 4. Let I be a resident-minimal instance and J a resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension of I. Then J is also resident-minimal. We also have prop(I) = prop(J) and tent(I) \ pend(I) ⊆ tent(J) ⊆ tent(I).
Proof. Let L be the set of all matches (r, h) such that h is on the preference list of r in I. Since I is resident-minimal, we have prop(I) = L. As prop(I) ⊆ prop(J) ⊆ L, we have prop(I) = prop(J) and J is residentminimal. It immediately follows that tent(J) ⊆ tent(I). Let (r, h) be a match in tent(I) \ pend(I). Then, r is on the preference list of h in I and hence extending the preference list of h does not affect the rank of r. Therefore, we have (r, h) ∈ tent(J) and hence tent(I) \ pend(I) ⊆ tent(J).
Let σ be an event sequence. We say that an extension σ + τ of σ is simple if prop(τ ) ∩ rej(τ ) = ∅ or, in words, τ never rejects a proposal made in itself. We say that an extension J of instance I is simple if the maximal I-feasible sequence has a simple maximal J-feasible extension or, equivalently, (prop(J) \ prop(I)) ∩ (rej(J) \ rej(I)) = ∅. The goal of this subsection is to show that, for each resident-minimal instance I, we do not need to search through all extensions of a maximal I-feasible sequence to decide the finalizability of a match in tent(I): we need only to look at simple extensions. Indeed, it will turn out that we need only to look at hospital-complete simple extensions.
Proposition 5. Let I be a resident-minimal instance and J a simple extension of I. Then, there is a simple and hospital-complete extension J of I such that rej(J) ⊆ rej(J ).
Proof. Let I and J be as in the lemma. We assume without loss of generality that J is resident-minimal: if not, take an appropriate truncation. Let J 1 be an arbitrary hospital-complete and resident-changeless extension of J. Since J is resident-minimal, so is J 1 by Proposition 4. We also have rej(J) ⊆ rej(J 1 ) and, moreover, (rej(J 1 ) \ rej(J)) ⊆ pend(J), since J 1 is a resident-changeless extension of J. We construct a simple extension of I by truncating preference lists of residents in J 1 . Let M = (rej(J 1 ) \ rej(J)) \ tent(I). For each (r, h) ∈ M , h is the last entry of the preference list of r in J and hence in J 1 , since (r, h) ∈ pend(J) and J is resident-minimal. Let J be obtained from J 1 by, for each match (r, h) ∈ M , removing h from the preference list of r. Then, we have
h is not on the preference list of r in I, since (r, h) ∈ (tent(I) ∪ rej(J)) ⊇ (tent(I) ∪ rej(I)) = prop(I). Therefore, J is an extension of I. We claim that it is a simple extension of I. To see this, observe that rej(J ) \ rej(J) ⊆ tent(I) from the construction of J . Since no match in (prop(J )\prop(I)) ⊆ (prop(J)\ prop(I)) can be in rej(J) as J is a simple extension of I, no such match can be in rej(J ). Therefore, J is a simple extension of I. As M ⊆ (rej(J 1 ) \ rej(J)) and rej(J ) = rej(J 1 ) \ M , we have rej(J) ⊆ rej(J ) and are done.
For the time being, we concentrate on resident-minimal instances that are also hospital-complete and try to characterize their simple extensions.
Proposition 6. Let I be a resident-minimal and hospital-complete instance and J a simple extension of I. Let P = prop(J) \ prop(I) and X = rej(J) \ rej(I). Then, these sets of matches satisfy the following conditions. P1: P ∩ prop(I) = ∅. P2: For each r ∈ R, there is at most one h ∈ H such that (r, h) ∈ P . P3: X ⊆ tent(I). P4: res P ∩ res tent(I) ⊆ res X. P5: For each h ∈ H, we have |res h (P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)))| ≤ q h . Moreover, if res h X is non-empty then we have |res h (P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)))| = q h . P6: For each h ∈ H, each member of res h (P ∪ (tent(I) \ X))) precedes all members of res h X in the preference list of h in I.
A prescription for resident-minimal and hospital complete instance I is a pair (P, X) of sets of matches that satisfies the conditions P1 through P6 in Proposition 6. The target set of prescription (P, X), denoted by tgs(P, X) is defined by tgs(P, X) = {(r, h) ∈ X | r ∈ res P }. The crucial part of the proof of the result in this section is in showing that a certain form of converse of Proposition 6 holds: a prescription (P, X) for I implies a simple extension of I that rejects matches in tgs(P, X). Proposition 7. Let I be a resident-minimal and hospital-complete instance and let (P, X) be a prescription for I. Then, we have |res P \res tent(I)| ≥ |tgs(P, X)|.
Proof. Let Q = {(r, h) ∈ P | r ∈ res tent(I)}. By condition P2 for (P, X) being a prescription for I, we have |Q| = |res P \ res tent(I)|. Our goal is to show that |Q| ≥ |tgs(P, X)|.
By condition P5 for (P, X) being a prescription for I, we have |res h X| ≤ |res h P | for each h ∈ H. Therefore, we have |X| ≤ |P |. On the other hand, let (r, h) be a match in (r, h) ∈ P \ Q. Because of condition P4, there is some h such that (r, h ) ∈ X. However, by definition, (r, h ) ∈ tgs(P, X) as r ∈ res P . Therefore, we have |P \Q| ≤ |X \tgs(P, X)|. As Q is a subset of P and tgs(P, X) is a subset of X, we have |P | − |Q| ≤ |X| − |tgs(P, X)|. Combining this with |X| ≤ |P |, we conclude that |Q| ≥ |tgs(P, X)|. Lemma 1. Let I be a resident-minimal and hospital-complete instance and suppose there is a prescription (P, X) for I. Then there is some simple extension J of I such that prop(J)\prop(I) ⊆ P , rej(J)\rej(I) ⊆ X, and tgs(P, X) ⊆ rej(J).
Proof. Let I and (P, X) be as in the lemma and σ a maximal I-feasible sequence.
We prove the statement of the lemma by induction on |P |. We take tgs(P, X) = ∅ as the base case, which includes the case P = X = ∅. The statement is satisfied with J = I in this case.
For the induction step, suppose tgs(P, X) is non-empty and let Q = {(r, h) ∈ P | r ∈ res tent(I)}. Since tgs(P, X) is non-empty, Q is non-empty by Proposition 7. Let σ + τ 1 be an extension of σ such that τ 1 first lists the proposals of matches in Q in an arbitrary order and then lists all rejections, in an arbitrary order, that are made possible by these proposals (without further chain of proposals and rejections). Then, σ + τ 1 is maximal I 1 -feasible where I 1 is the extension of I obtained by appending h in the preference list of r for each (r, h) ∈ Q. We claim that rej(τ 1 ) ⊆ X. To see this, fix h ∈ H. By condition P5 for (P, X) being a prescription for I, we have |res h (P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)))| ≤ q h and hence |res h (Q ∪ (tent(I) \ X)| ≤ q h . Thus, no match (r, h) is rejected by τ 1 unless (r, h) ∈ X. If tgs(P, X) ⊆ rej(I 1 ) then we are done with J = I 1 .
So suppose otherwise, that tgs(P, X) is not contained in rej(I 1 ). Consider the prescription (P 1 , X 1 ) for I 1 where P 1 = P \ Q and X 1 = X \ rej(τ 1 ). We confirm that this pair is indeed a prescription for I 1 . From condition P1 for (P, X) being a prescription for I, we have P ∩ prop(I) = ∅. Since prop(I 1 ) = prop(I) ∪ Q and P 1 = P \ Q, it follows that P 1 ∩ prop(I 1 ) = ∅, condition P1 for (P 1 , X 1 ) being a prescription for I 1 . Condition P2 immediately follows from the corresponding condition for (P, X). Since X ⊆ tent(I) (condition P3 for (P, X)) and X 1 = X \ rej(τ 1 ), we have X 1 ⊆ tent(I) \ rej(τ 1 ) ⊆ tent(I 1 ), condition P3.
For condition P4, we use the facts that P 1 and Q partition P and that Q and tent(I) \ rej(τ 1) partition tent(I 1 ). Also using condition P4 for (P, X) that res P ∩ res tent(I) ⊆ X, we have res P 1 ∩ res tent(I 1 ) = (res P \ res Q) ∩ res(Q ∪ (tent(I) \ rej(τ 1 ))) = (res P \ res Q) ∩ (res Q ∪ (res tent(I) \ res rej(τ 1 ))) = res P ∩ (res tent(I) \ res rej(τ 1 )) = (res P ∩ res tent(I)) \ res rej(τ 1 )
Therefore, condition P4 holds.
For conditions P5 and P6, observe that
where we have repeatedly used the disjointness between subsets of P and subsets of X. Therefore, for each h ∈ H, we have res(P 1 ∪ (tent(I 1 ) \ X 1 )) = res(P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)) and hence condition P5 for (P 1 , X 1 ) follows from that for (P, X). Moreover, by condition P6 for (P, X), each member of res h (P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)) precedes all members of X in the preference list of h in I. Since X 1 ⊆ X and I 1 is an extension of I, it follows that each member of res h (P 1 ∪ (tent(I 1 ) \ X 1 )) precedes all members of X 1 in the preference list of h in I 1 : condition P6 holds. We have confirmed that (P 1 , X 1 ) is indeed a prescription for I 1 . We note that tgs(P 1 , X 1 ) = tgs(P, X) \ rej(τ 1 ) is non-empty under our current assumption. Therefore, we may apply the induction hypothesis to instance I 1 and prescription (P 1 , X 1 ) for I 1 to obtain a simple and hospital-complete extension I 1 of I 1 such that prop(I 1 ) \ prop(I 1 ) ⊆ P 1 , rej(I 1 ) \ rej(I 1 ) ⊆ X 1 , and tgs(P 1 , X 1 ) ⊆ rej(I 1 ). We have
since rej(τ 1 ) ⊆ rej(I 1 ) ⊆ rej(I 1 ). Therefore, setting J = I 1 , the statement of the lemma holds. This completes the induction step and hence the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 2. Let I be a resident-minimal and hospital-complete instance and (r 0 , h 0 ) a match in tent(I) that is not finalizable in I. Let σ be a maximal I-feasible sequence and σ + τ a shortest feasible extension of σ that rejects (r 0 , h 0 ). Then, (prop(τ ), rej(τ )) is a prescription for I with tgs(prop(τ ), rej(τ )) = {(r 0 , h 0 )}.
Proof. We set P = prop(τ ) \ rej(τ ) and X = rej(τ ) \ prop(τ ). It will turn out that prop(τ ) ∩ rej(τ ) = ∅ and hence P = prop(τ ) and X = rej(τ ).
We first confirm that (P, X) is a prescription for I. Since σ + τ is feasible, P ⊆ prop(τ ) is disjoint from prop(σ) = prop(I): condition P1 holds. Since P ⊆ tent(σ + τ ), for each r ∈ R, there is at most one h such that (r, h) ∈ P : condition P2 holds. Since each match rejected by τ but not already in tent(σ) must be in prop(τ ), we have X ⊆ tent(I): condition P3 holds. For condition P4, let r ∈ res P ∩ res tent(I). As (r, h) for some h is proposed in τ , some match (r, h ) ∈ tent(I) must be rejected in τ and hence in rej(τ ) \ prop(τ ) = X. Therefore, we have res P ∩ res tent(I) ⊆ res X.
For conditions P5 and P6, fix h ∈ H. Since P ∪ (tent(I) \ X) = tent(σ + τ ), we have |res h (P ∪ (tent(I) \ X))| ≤ q h . Moreover, if res h X is non-empty, then τ rejects a match involving h and therefore this inequality is tight. Therefore, condition P5 holds. As each member of res h (tent(σ + τ )) precedes all members of res h (rej(τ )), condition P6 holds.
We have (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ rej(τ ) and, from the assumption that τ is chosen to be the shortest, r 0 is not involved in any proposal in τ . Therefore (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, X). A match (r, h) in tgs(P, X) distinct from (r 0 , h 0 ) would also contradict that assumption, since the rejection of such (r, h) may be removed from τ without affecting the feasibility as r is not involved in any proposal in τ . We conclude that tgs(P, X) = {(r 0 , h 0 )}.
By Lemma 1, there is a simple extension J of I such that prop(J)\prop(I) ⊆ P , rej(J) \ rej(I) ⊆ X, and (r 0 , h 0 ) ⊆ rej(J). Let σ + τ be a maximum Jfeasible extension of σ. Then, prop(τ ) = prop(J) \ prop(I) ⊆ P ⊆ prop(τ ) and rej(τ ) = rej(J) \ rej(I) ⊆ X ⊆ rej(τ ). All of these inclusions must in fact be equalities, since otherwise σ + τ is a feasible extension of σ rejecting (r 0 , h 0 ) that is shorter than σ + τ , a contradiction. Therefore, we have prop(τ ) = prop(τ ) = P and rej(τ ) = rej(τ ) = X, finishing the proof of the lemma.
We have focused on those resident-minimal instances that are also hospitalcomplete. The following theorem, however, is on general resident-minimal instances.
Theorem 2. . Let I be a resident-minimal instance and (r 0 , h 0 ) a match in tent(I). Then, the following three conditions are equivalent.
(1) Match (r 0 , h 0 ) is not finalizable in I.
(2) There is a resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension I of I such that there is a prescription (P, Y ) for I with (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, Y ). (3) There is a simple extension of I that rejects (r 0 , h 0 ).
(1) ⇒ (2): Suppose (r 0 , h 0 ) is not finalizable in I. Let J be an extension of I that rejects (r 0 , h 0 ). Let J be an arbitrary resident-changeless and hospitalcomplete extension of J. We let I be the resident-changeless and hospitalcomplete extension of I in which the preference list of each hospital is identical to that in J . By Proposition 4, I is resident-minimal. Since J is an extension of I and rejects (r 0 , h 0 ), by Lemma 2, there is a prescription (P, Y ) for I such that (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, Y ).
(2) ⇒ (3): Let I and (P, Y ) be as in condition (2) . By Lemma 1, there is a simple extension J of I such that tgs(P, Y ) ⊆ rej(J). Since J is a simple extension of I, we are done.
This theorem shows that, for resident-minimal instance I, a triple (P, Y, I ), where I is a resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension of I and (P, Y ) is a prescription for I , is a certificate that each match in tgs(P, Y ) is not finalizable in I. We seek a more concise certificate and generalize the notion of prescription to general resident-minimal instances.
Let I be a resident-minimal instance. A prescription for I is a pair (P, X) of sets of matches that satisfies conditions P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 in Proposition 6 together with the following condition that replaces P6.
P6': For each h ∈ H, the following holds. Each member of res h (P ∪ ((tent(I) \ pend(I)) \ X))) precedes all members of res h (X \ pend(I)) in the preference list of h in I. Moreover, if res h (X \ pend(I)) is non-empty then res h pend(I) ⊆ res h X.
The target set tgs(P, X) of prescription (P, X) is defined in the same manner as in the special case before: tgs(P, X) = {(r, h) ∈ X | r ∈ res P }.
Note that if I is hospital-complete then pend(I) is empty and hence condition P6' is equivalent to condition P6.
Lemma 3. Let I be a resident-minimal instance, I a resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension of I, and (P, Y ) a prescription for I . Then, (P, X), where X = Y ∪ (rej(I ) \ rej(I)) is a prescription for I.
Proof. Conditions P1 and P2 do not depend on X and therefore follow from those conditions for prescription (P, Y ). Since Y ⊆ tent(I ) ⊆ tent(I) and rej(I ) \ rej(I) ⊆ tent(I), condition P3 that X ⊆ tent(I) holds. For condition P4, let r ∈ res P ∩ res tent(I). If r ∈ res P ∩ res tent(I ) then r ∈ Y by condition P4 for prescription (P, Y ). Otherwise, r ∈ res(rej(I ) \ rej(I)) ⊆ res X. Therefore, condition P4 holds. Condition P5 is equivalent to condition P5 for prescription (P, Y ), since P ∪(tent(I)\X) = P ∪(tent(I )\Y ). For condition P6, fix h ∈ H. In the preference list of h in I , each member of res h (P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)) precedes all members of res h Y by condition P6 for prescription (P, Y ), and obviously precedes all members of res h (rej(I )\rej(I)). Therefore, it precedes all members of res h X. If r ∈ res pend(I) then r is already in the preference list of h in I. Therefore, each member of res h (P ∪ ((tent(I) \ pend(I)) \ X))) precedes all members of res h (X \pend(I)) in the preference list of h in I. Moreover, suppose some r ∈ res h (X \ pend(I)) and some r ∈ res h (pend(I) \ X). Then, since r is in res h (P ∪ (tent(I) \ X)) and r ∈ res h Y , r must precede r in the preference list of h in I . But this is impossible since r is on the preference list of h in I while r is not, a contradiction. Therefore, if res h (X \ pend(I)) is non-empty then res h pend(I) ⊆ res h X: condition P6 holds.
Lemma 4. Let I be a resident-minimal instance and (P, X) is a prescription for I. Then, there is some resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension I of I such that (P, Y ), where Y = X \ rej(I ), is a prescription for I .
Proof. For each h ∈ H, arbitrarily complete the preference list of h in I so that the residents in res h (pend(I) ∩ X) get the lowest ranks in the completed list. Let the resulting instance be I . We confirm that (P, Y ) is a prescription for I . Conditions P1 and P2 do not depend on P and therefore follow from those conditions for prescription (P, X). Since X ⊆ tent(I) and tent(I ) = tent(I)\rej(I ), condition P3 that Y ⊆ tent(I ) holds. For condition P4, let r ∈ res P ∩ res tent(I ). Since r ∈ res P ∩ tent(I), we have r ∈ res X by condition P4 for prescription (P, X). Therefore, we have r ∈ res X ∩res tent(I ) = res(X \ rej(I )) = res Y , condition P4. Condition P5 is equivalent to condition P5 for prescription (P, X), since P ∪ (tent(I) \ X) = P ∪ (tent(I ) \ Y ).
To show that P6 holds, let r ∈ res h (P ∪(tent(I )\Y ))) = res h (P ∪(tent(I)\ X)). Suppose first that r ∈ res h pend(I). Then, by condition P6' for (P, X), r precedes all members of res h (Y \ pend(I)) ⊆ res h (X \ pend(I)) in the preference list of h in I and hence in I as well. Since r precedes all members of res h pend(I) in the preference list of h in I by the way I completes the preference list of h, we conclude that r precedes all members of res h X in that preference list. Suppose next that r ∈ res h pend(I). Then, since res h pend(I), having r as a member, is not contained in res h X, res h (X \ pend(I)) is empty, by condition P6' for (P, X). Therefore r precedes all members in res h X in the preference list of h in I , as those members are placed in the lowest positions. In either case, r precedes all members of res h Y ⊆ res h X in the preference list of h in I , that is, condition P6 holds for (P, Y ).
Thus, a prescription for a general resident-minimal instance is indeed a certificate for the negative answer to the finalizability of a tentative match.
Theorem 3. Let I be a resident-minimal instance and (r 0 , h 0 ) a match in tent(I)\ pend(I). Then, there is a prescription (P, X) for I with (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, X) if and only if there is some resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension I of I and a prescription (P, Y ) for I with (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ (P, Y ).
Proof. Suppose first that there is a prescription (P, X) for I with (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, X). By Lemma 4, there is a resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension I of I and a prescription (P, Y ) for I such that Y = X \ rej(I ). As X ∩ rej(I ) ⊆ pend(I) and (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ pend(I), (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, X) implies (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, Y ). For the converse, suppose that there is a resident-changeless and hospital-complete extension I of I and a prescription (P, Y ) for I with (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, Y ). By Lemma 3, (P, X), where X = Y ∪ (rej(I ) \ rej(I)), is a prescription for I. Since tgs(P, Y ) ⊆ tgs(P, X), we have (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, X).
We close this subsection by sketching an integer program (IP) for computing a prescription for a given resident-minimal instance I and a match (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tent(I). More precisely, the IP captures a triple (P, X, Z), where (P, X) is a prescription for I with (r 0 , h 0 ) ∈ tgs(P, X) and Z is a subset of pend(I) such that there is a resident-changeless and hospital complete extension J of I with Z = rej(J) \ rej(I) and (P, X \ Z) being a prescription for J.
We only describe the variables in the IP and their intended interpretations. The linear constraints are straightforward to write down based on those interpretations. All the variables are binary. For each match (r, h) ∈ prop(I), we have a variable p r,h : p r,h = 1 if and only if (r, h) ∈ P . For each match (r, h) ∈ tent(I), we have a variable x r,h : x r,h = 1 if and only if (r, h) ∈ X. For each h ∈ H and a subset S of res h pend(I), we have a variable z h,S : z h,S = 1 if and only if res h Z = S. The objective function is the sum of p r,h over all (r, h) ∈ (R × H) \ prop(I), which is minimized. The optimal solution of this IP corresponds to a desired prescription with the smallest cardinality of P .
Polynomial time algorithm for the stable marriage case
In this subsection, we show that 1-FTM-RM, the finalizability of a tentative match for resident-minimal stable marriage instances, is polynomial time solvable.
Let I be a resident-minimal stable marriage instance. We define a bipartite digraph G I on vertex sets T = tent(I) and P = (R × H) \ prop(I) as follows. Let (r, h) ∈ T and (r , h ) ∈ P . There is an edge from (r, h) to (r , h ) if and only if r = r . There is an edge from (r , h ) to (r, h) if and only if h = h , both r and r are on the preference list of h in I, and r precedes r in that list.
Lemma 5. Let I be a resident-minimal stable marriage instance and (r 0 , h 0 ) a match in tent(I). Then, there is a simple extension of I that rejects (r 0 , h 0 ) if and only if there is a directed path in G I from some root (a vertex without incoming edges) of G I to (r 0 , h 0 ).
Proof. Suppose first that I has a simple extension I that rejects (r 0 , h 0 ). Let σ be a maximal I-feasible sequence and σ + τ a maximal I -feasible sequence. We determine a sequence of matches (r i , h i ), i = 0, 1, . . ., so that the reversed sequence (r j , h j ), j = i, i−1, . . . , 0, forms a directed path from (r i , h i ) to (r 0 , h 0 ) in I, for each i. We maintain the invariant that if (r i , h i ) ∈ T then (r i , h i ) ∈ rej(τ ) and if (r i , h i ) ∈ P then (r i , h i ) ∈ prop(τ ). We sart with the given match (r 0 , h 0 ).
Suppose i ≥ 0 and match (r i , h i ) has been determined. If (r i , h i ) is a root of G I then we are done as we have a desired path from (r i , h i ) to (r 0 , h 0 ). Suppose otherwise. First suppose that (r i , h i ) ∈ T . If (r i , h i ) ∈ pend(I) then r i is not on the preference list of h i in I and hence there is no incoming edge to (r i , h i ) in G I . Since we are assuming that (r i , h i ) is not a root of G I , we conclude that (r i , h i ) ∈ tent(I) \ pend(I). Due to the invariant, (r i , h i ) is in rej(τ ) and hence its rejection must be preceded in τ by a proposal of some match (r, h i ) in prop(τ ) ⊆ P such that r precedes r i in the preference list of h i and hence there is an edge of G i from (r, h i ) to (r i , h i ). We let (r i+1 , h i+1 ) = (r, h i ). Next suppose (r i , h i ) ∈ P . Then, by the invariant we have (r i , h i ) ∈ prop(τ ). If r i ∈ res tent(I) then (r i , h i ) is a root of G I and we are done. Otherwise, the proposal of (r i , h i ) must be preceded in τ by the rejection of (r i , h) for some h. We let (r i+1 , h i+1 ) = (r i , h).
As the construction selects matches appearing in τ in the reversed order, it must eventually end at a root of G I .
For the converse, suppose there is a directed path p from some root of G I to (r 0 , h 0 ). Let τ p be an event sequence listing the matches in p in the same order and making each match in P a proposal and each match in T a rejection. Extend I by adding h to the preference list of r, for each (r, h) ∈ prop(τ p ). Furthermore, if the starting vertex (r * , h * ) of p is in T , which implies that (r * , h * ) ∈ pend(I), complete the preference list of h * so that r * gets the lowest rank. Let I be the resulting extension of I. Let σ be a maximal I-feasible sequence. If (r * , h * ) ∈ T then, as the quota of each hospital is one, σ + (r * , h * ) − is I -feasible. Otherwise, since (r * , h * ) ∈ P and r * ∈ res tent(I), it follows that σ + (r * , h * ) + is Ifeasible. By a straightforward induction, we may verify that σ + τ p is I -feasible. As rej(τ p ) ⊆ tent(I), σ + τ p is a simple extension of σ and hence I is a simple extension of I that rejects (r 0 , h 0 ).
The following theorem is immediate from Theorem 2 and Lemma 5. 
Hardness of FTM-RM
In this subsection, we show that 2-FTM-RM, and hence FTM-RM, is coNPcomplete. The reduction is from SAT through an intermediate problem we call DIGRAPH-FIRING.
Let G be a digraph and θ : V (G) → N be a threshold function which assigns a non-negative integer θ(v) to each vertex v of G. A θ-firing of G is a subgraph F of G such that, for each v ∈ V (F ), the in-degree of v in F is at least θ(v) and the out-degree of v in F is at most 1.
k-DIGRAPH-FIRING
Instance: A triple (G, t, θ), where G is a digraph, t is a vertex of G, and θ is a threshold function on V (G) such that θ(v) ≤ k for every v ∈ V (G). Question: Does G have a θ-firing that contains t?
Proof. That 2-DAG-FIRING is in NP is trivial. We show its NP-hardness by a reduction from SAT. Let S be a set of clauses, X the set of variables of S, and C 1 , . . . , C m the enumeration of clauses in S. Using Proposition 3, we assume that each variable in X appears positively in exactly two clauses and negatively in exactly one clause. For each x ∈ X, let i for each x ∈ X. The edge set is defined by
We set t = b m . The threshold function θ is such that θ(v) is the in-degree of v except that θ(a i ) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since the only vertices with indegree possibly larger than two are a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have θ(v) ≤ 2 for every v ∈ V (G).
See Fig. 2 for an example.
(a) Clause set S (b) DAG G; threshold is equal to the in-degree unless explicitly specified on the shoulder . Given this property of the "variable gadgets" in G, it is straightforward to see that there is a mutual conversion between a satisfying assignments of S and a θ-firing of G containing t.
Proof. That 2-FTM-RM is in coNP is trivial. To show that it is coNP-hard, we we give a polynomial time reduction from k-DAG-FIRING to the complement of k-FTM-RM, for each positive integer k. As 2-DAG-FIRING is NP-complete by Lemma 6, the theorem follows.
Fix k. Let (G, t, θ) be an instance of k-DAG-FIRING. Without loss of generality, we assume that t is a sink of G. For each v ∈ G, let N − (v) denote the set of in-neighbors of v in G and let V 0 = {v ∈ V (G) | N − (v) = ∅} denote the set of roots of G. We construct an instance I = (R, H, {q h } h∈H , {π h } h∈H , {λ r } r∈R ) as follows. For each v ∈ V (G), we have a mutually distinct resident r v and we set R = {r v | v ∈ V (G)}. For each non-root vertex v ∈ V (G) \ V 0 , we have a mutually distinct hospital h v and we set
, in the first |N − (v)| places in an arbitrary order and then lists r v as its final element. For each root v ∈ V 0 , the preference list of r v is empty (nothing disclosed). For each nonroot vertex v ∈ V (G) \ V 0 , the preference list of r v consists of a single entry h v (only the top preference is disclosed). Finally, the match for which we ask the finalizability is (r t , h t ). It is straightforward to verify that I is resident-minimal and that and (r t , h t ) ∈ tent(I); in fact we have (r v , h v ) ∈ tent(I) for every v ∈ V (G) \ V 0 . It is also clear that the quota of each hospital in I is k or smaller.
See Figure 3 for an example. First suppose that G has a θ-firing F that contains t. We show that then (r t , h t ) is not finalizable in I. Let I be obtained from I by adding h v at the end of the preference list of r u in I, for each (u, v) ∈ F . Let v 1 , . . . , v n = t be a topologically sorted enumeration of V (F ). We define I -feasible sequence σ i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n, inductively as follows. We will maintain the induction hypothesis that σ i is I -feasible and tent 
+ . Since r vi ∈ res tent(I) and h v k is ranked top in the preference list of r vi in I , σ i is I -feasible. The induction hypothesis is maintained since we have
In this case, the in-degree of v i in F is at least θ(v i ) = q hv i . For each in-neighbor v j of v i in F , its index j < i and, by the induction hypothesis, we have (r vj , h vi ) ∈ tent(σ i−1 ). Therefore, the preference list of h vi in I has at least q hv i residents in res h tent(σ i−1 ) that precede r vi and therefore σ i = σ i−1 + (r vi , h vi )
− is Ifeasible. Moreover, since r vi ranks h v k immediately after h vi , σ i = σ i +(r vi , h v k ) + is I -feasible. We also have tent(σ i ) = tent(σ i−1 ) ∪ {(r vi , h v k )} \ {(r vi , h vi )} and therefore the induction hypothesis is maintained. This construction leads to a I -feasible sequence σ n that rejects (r t , r t ). Therefore, (r t , h t ) is not finalizable in I.
For the converse, suppose (r t , h t ) is not finalizable in I. Since I is residentminimal, by Theorem 2, there is some simple extension I of I that rejects (r t , h t ). We assume without loss of generality that I is resident-minimal: take an appropriate truncation if not. Let U = V 0 ∪{v ∈ V (G)\V 0 | (r v , h v ) ∈ rej(τ )} and let F be the subgraph of G induced by U . We show that F is a θ-firing of G. We first show that the out-degree of each vertex in F is at most 1. Let (u, v) be an arbitrary edge of F . By the definition of G, r u precedes r v in the preference list of h v in I. Since v ∈ U , (r v , h v ) is rejected by τ , which implies that τ contains the proposal of (r, h v ) for every r that precedes r v in the preference list of h v (recall that there are exactly q hv such residents r), including r u . Therefore, the extension of the preference list of r u from I to I is by h v . This show that, for each u, the vertex v such that (u, v) is an edge of F is unique if one exists: the out-degree of each vertex in F is at most 1.
We next show that the in-degree of each vertex v is at least θ(v). If v ∈ V 0 , this is obvious since θ(v) = 0. Suppose v ∈ U \ V 0 . Then, since τ rejects (r v , h v ), this rejection event must be preceded in τ by the proposal of (r u , h v ) for every resident r u in the set of the q hv = θ(v) residents that precede r v in the preference list of h v . But for each such resident r u , either u is in V 0 (hence r u ∈ res tent(I)) or the rejection of (r u , h u ) precedes the proposal of (r u , h v ) in τ . In either case, we have u ∈ U . Therefore, the in-degree of v is in F is at least θ(v). We conclude that F is a θ-firing of G. Since τ rejects (r t , h t ), we have t ∈ U . This completes the proof that if (r t , h t ) is not finalizable then then there is a θ-firing of G that contains t.
A sufficient condition for finalizability
In this section, we introduce a polynomial-time decidable sufficient condition for a match to be finalizable in a given instance. This condition turns out necessary for resident-minimal instances in the stable marriage case, thus providing another proof that 1-FTM-RM is polynomial time solvable (Theorem 4).
Let I be an instance and M a subset of tent(I). We say that r ∈ R is relevant to h ∈ H with respect to M if r is matched in M either to h or to no hospital. We say that a match (r, h) in M is dangerous in M with respect to I if it satisfies the following condition: if (r, h) ∈ tent(I) \ pend(I) then the preference list of h in I contains q h or more residents before h that are relevant to h with respect to M ; if (r, h) ∈ pend(I) then the number of residents relevant to h with respect to M is q h + 1 or greater. We denote by dang I (M ) the set of dangerous matches with respect to M in I. We say that the set M is safe with respect to I if dang I (M ) = ∅. Observe that dang I is monotone decreasing in the following sense: if M ⊆ M ⊆ tent(I) and (r, h) ∈ M \ dang I (M ) then (r, h) ∈ dang I (M ).
See Table 1 for an example. The latter condition implies that (r 0 , h 1 ) ∈ tent(I). Moreover, (r 0 , h 1 ) is not in prop(I) since if it were then it would be impossible for (r 1 , h 1 ) to be in tent(I). Since I is resident-minimal, it follows that h 1 is not in the preference list of r 0 . We let I 1 be obtained from I by appending h 1 to the preference list of r 0 and let σ 1 = σ + (r 0 , h 1 ) + + (r 1 , h 1 ) − . In either case, σ 1 is I 1 -feasible. In general, we maintain the invariant that (r j , h j ) ∈ rej(σ j ) and σ j is I j -feasible for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Suppose j > 1 and I j−1 together with σ j−1 has been defined. Let I j be obtained from I j−1 by appending h j to the preference list of r j−1 and let σ j = σ j−1 + (r j−1 , h j ) + + (r j , h j ) − . As (r j−1 , h j−1 ) ∈ rej(σ j−1 ), σ j−1 + (r j−1 , h j )
+ is I j -feasible. Moreover, since r j−1 precedes r j in the preference list of h j by constructin, σ j is I j -feasible. We conclude that (r, h) = (r m , h m ) is not finalizable in I since the extension I m of I rejects (r m , h m ).
It follows as a corollary to Proposition 8, Theorem 6, and Theorem 7 that 1-FTM-RM is polynomial time solvable giving another proof of Theorem 4.
